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Abstract
In a Multi-Prover environment, how little spatial separation is sufficient to assert the validity of an
NP statement in Perfect Zero-Knowledge ? We exhibit a set of two novel Zero-Knowledge protocols
for the 3-COLorability problem that use two (local) provers or three (entangled) provers and only
require exchanging one edge and two bits with two trits per prover. This greatly improves the ability
to prove Zero-Knowledge statements on very short distances with very basic communication gear.
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1 Introduction
The idea of using distance and special relativity (a theory of motion justifying that the speed of
light is a sort of asymptote for displacement) to prevent communication between participants
to multi-prover proof systems can be traced back to Kilian[16]. Probably, the original authors
(Ben Or, Goldwasser, Kilian and Wigderson) of [1] had that in mind already, but it is not
explicitly written anywhere. Kent was the first author to venture into sustainable relativistic
commitments [15] and introduced the idea of arbitrarily prolonging their life span by playing
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some ping-pong protocol between the provers (near the speed of light). This idea was made
considerably more practical by Lunghi et al. in [19] who made commitment sustainability
much more efficient. This culminated into an actual implementation by Verbanis et al. in
[23] where commitments were sustained for more than a day!
As nice as this may sound, such long-lasting commitments have found so far very little
practical use. Consider for instance the zero-knowledge proof for Hamiltonian Cycle as
introduced by Chailloux and Leverrier[3]. Proving in Zero-Knowledge that a 500-vertex
graph contains a Hamiltonian cycle would require transmitting 250 000 bit commitments
(each of a couple hundreds of bits in length) and eventually sustaining them before the verifier
can announce his choice of unveiling the whole adjacency matrix or just the Hamiltonian cycle.
For a graph of |V | vertices, this would require an estimated 200|V |2 bits of communication
before the verifier can announce his choice chall (see Fig. 1). This makes the application
prohibitively expensive. If you use a larger graph, you will need more time to commit,
leading to more distance to implement the protocol of [3]. Either a huge separation is
necessary between the provers (so that one of them can unveil according to the verifier’s
choice chall before he finds out the committal information B used by the other prover while
the former must commit all the necessary information before he can find out the verifier’s
choice chall) or we must achieve extreme communication speeds between prover-verifier pairs.
This would only be possible by vastly parallelizing communications between them at high
cost. Modern (expensive) top-of-line communication equipment may reach throughputs of
roughly 1Tbits/sec. A back of the envelope calculation estimates that the distance between
the verifiers must be at least 100 km to transmit 250 000 commitments at such a rate.
In this work we consider the following problem: in a Multi-Prover environment, how little
spatial separation is sufficient to assert the validity of an NP statement in Perfect Zero-
Knowledge ? We exhibit a set of two novel Zero-Knowledge protocols for the 3-COLorability
problem that use two (local) provers or three (entangled) provers and only require them to
communicate two trits each after having each received an edge and two bits each from the
verifier. This greatly improves the ability to prove Zero-Knowledge statements on very short
distances with very minimal communication equipment. In comparison, the protocol of [3]
would require transmitting millions of bits between a prover and his verifier before the latter
may disclose what to unveil or not. This implies the provers would have to be very far from
each other because all of these must reach the verifier before the formers can communicate.
Although certain algebraic zero-knowledge multi-prover interactive proofs for NP and
NEXP using explicitly no commitments at all have been presented before in [18], [10]
(sound against local provers) and [5],[12] (sound against entangled provers), in the local
cases making these protocols entanglement sound is absolutely non-trivial, whereas in the
entangled case the multi-round structure and the amount of communication in each round
makes implementing the protocol completely impractical as well. (To their defense, the
protocols were not designed to be practical).
The main technical tool we use in this work is a general Lemma of Kempe, Kobayashi,
Matsumoto, Toner, and Vidick[13] to prove soundness of a three-prover protocol when the
provers are entangled based on the fact that a two-prover protocol version is sound when the
provers are only local. More precisely, they proved this when the three-prover version is the
same as the two-prover version but augmented with an extra prover who is asked exactly the
same questions as one of the other two at random and is expected to give the same exact
answers.
Our protocols build on top of the earlier protocol due to Cleve, Høyer, Toner and
Watrous[7] who presented an extremely simple and efficient solution to the 3-COL problem
that uses only two provers, each of which is queried with either a vertex from a common edge,
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Figure 1 Space-Time diagrams of [3]’s ZK-MIP? for NP. (45◦ diagonals are the speed of light.)
In the above two diagrams, V1 at a first location sends a random matrix B to P1 who uses each
entry to commit an entry of the adjacency matrix Y of G. At another location, V2 sends a
random challenge chall to P2 who unveils all or some commitments as A . At all times, V1 and
V2 must make sure that the answers they get from P1 and P2 come early enough that the direct
communication line between V1 and V2 (even at the speed of light) is not crossed. The transition from
left to right shows that increasing the number of vertices (and thus increasing the total commit time)
pushes the verifiers further away from each other. In [3] the distance must increase quadratically
with the number of vertices in the graph.
or twice the same vertex. In the former case, the verifier checks that the two ends of the
selected edge are of distinct colours, while in the latter case, he check only that the provers
answer the same colour given the same vertex. On the bright side, their protocol did not use
commitments at all but unfortunately it did not provide Zero-Knowledge either. Moreover,
it is a well established fact that this protocol cannot possibly be sound against entangled
provers, because certain graph families have the property that they are not 3-colourable
while having entangled-prover pairs capable of winning the game above with probability one.
This was already known at the time when they introduced their protocol. The reason this
protocol is not zero-knowledge follows from the undesirable fact that dishonest verifiers can
discover the (random) colouring of non-edge pairs of vertices in the graph, revealing if they
are of the same colour or not in the provers’ colouring.
We are able to remedy to the zero-knowledge difficulty by allowing the provers to use
commitments for the colour of their vertices. However they use these commitments in
an innovative way that we call the unveil-via-commit principle (of independent interest)
explained below. For this purpose we use commitments similar to those of Lunghi et al.[19]
but in their simplest form possible, over the field F3 (or F4 if you insist working in binary),
and thus with extremely weak binding property but also minimal in communication cost: a
complete execution of the basic protocol transmits a question Q of exactly one edge number
(using only log |E| bits) and two bits from verifiers to provers and an answer A of two trits
back from the provers to verifiers (see Fig. 2). This implies that for a fixed communication
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Figure 2 Space-Time diagram of our ZK-MIP? for NP. (45◦ diagonals are the speed of light.)
speed, the minimal distance of the provers in our protocol increases logarithmically with the
number of vertices whereas the same parameter grows quadratically in [3]. Nevertheless, this
is good enough to obtain a zero-knowledge version of the protocol that remains sound against
local pairs of provers. The main idea being that the provers will each commit to the colours
of two requested vertices only if they form an edge of the graph. To unveil the colour of any
vertex, the verifiers must request commitment of the same vertex by both provers but using
different randomizations. This way the verifiers may compute the colour of a vertex from the
linear system established by the two commitments and not by explicitly requesting anyone to
unveil. This is the unveil-via-commit principle (very similar to the double-spending detection
mechanism of the untraceable electronic cash of Chaum, Fiat and Naor[4]). We then use
the Lemma of [13] to prove soundness of the three-prover version of this protocol even when
the provers are entangled. A positive side of the protocol of [3], however, is the fact that
only two provers are necessary while we use three. Zero-Knowledge follows from the fact
that only two edge vertices can be unveiled by requesting the same edge to both provers.
Otherwise only a single vertex may be unveiled. Finally, we show that even the three-prover
version of this protocol retains the zero-knowledge property: requesting any three edges from
the provers may allow the dishonest verifiers to unveil the colours of a triangle in the graph
but never two end-points that do not form an edge (going to four provers would however
defeat the zero-knowledge aspect).
An actual physical implementation of this protocol is currently being developed.
1.1 Implementations Issues
Traditionally in the setup of Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs, there is a single verifier
interacting with the many provers. However, when implementing no-communication via
spatial separation (the so called relativistic setting) it is standard to break the verifier in
a number of verifiers equal to the number of provers, each of them interacting at very
short distance from their own prover. The verifiers can use the timing of the replies of
their respective provers to judge their relative distance. In practice, this means that we
can implement MIPs under relativistic assumptions if the verifier are “split” into multiple
verifiers, each locally interacting with its corresponding prover. The verifiers use the distance
between themselves to enforce the impossibility of the provers to communicate: no message
from a verifier can be used to reply to another verifier faster than the speed of light wherever
the provers are located.
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Moreover, multi-prover interactive proof systems may have several rounds in addition to
several provers. In general, protocols with several rounds may cause a threat to the inherent
assumption that the provers are not allowed to communicate during the protocol’s execution.
Nevertheless, most of the existing literature resolves this issue by providing an honest verifier
that is non-adaptive. To simplify this task, most of the protocols are actually single-round.
We stick to these guidelines in this work. Moreover, in order to prove soundness of our
protocols against entangled provers, we use a theorem that is currently only proven for
single-round protocols. The protocols we describe are indeed single-round and non-adaptive.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
Random variables A,B ∈ Γ are said to be equivalent, denoted A = B, if for all x ∈ Γ,
Pr{(A = x)} = Pr{(B = x)}. The class of probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines
will be denoted PPT in the following. A PPT Turing machine is one having access to a fresh
infinite read-only tape of random values (uniform values from the set of input symbols) at the
outset of the computation. In the following, adversaries will also be allowed (in some cases)
to be quantum machines. The precise ways quantum and classical machines are defined is
not important in the following.
ForM a Turing machine, we denote byM(x) it execution with x on its input tape (x being
a string of the tape alphabet symbols). A Turing machine (quantum or classical) augmented
with read-only auxiliary-input tapes and write-only auxiliary-output tapes is called an
interactive Turing machine (ITM). Read-only input tapes provide incoming messages while
the write-only output tapes allow to send messages. Interactive Turing machine M1 and
M2 are said to interact when for each of them, one of its write-only auxiliary-output tape
corresponds to one read-only auxiliary-input tape of the other Turing machine. An execution
of interactive Turing machines M1, . . . ,Mk on common input x is denoted [M1 . . .Mk](x).
For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, machine Mi accepts the interactive computation on input x if it stops in state
accept after the execution [M1 . . .Mk](x). When the ITM Mi that accepts a computation is
clear from the context, we say that [M1 . . .Mk](x) accepts when Mi’s final state is accept.
In this scenario, Pr{([M1 . . .Mk](x) = accept)} denotes the probability that Mi terminates
in state accept upon common input x. Quantum machines are also interacting through
communication tapes the same way than for classical machines. When a quantum machine
M1 interacts with a classical machine M2, we suppose that the write-only auxiliary tape and
the reade-only auxiliary tape of M1 used to communicate with M2 are classical. This is the
situation we will be addressing almost all the time in the following. A quantum machine M
is also allowed to have a quantum auxiliary read-only input tape that may contain a part
of a quantum state shared with other machines. This allows to model machines sharing
entanglement at the outset of an interactive computation. Henceforth, we suppose that the
(main) input tape of all machines (quantum or classical) is classical.
In the following, G = (V,E) denotes an undirected graph with vertices V and edges E.
If n = |V | then we denote the set of vertices in G by V = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We suppose that
(i, i) /∈ E for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (i.e. G has no loop). We denote uniquely each edge in E as
(i, j) with j > i. For i ∈ V , let Edges(i) := {(j, i) ∈ E}j<i ∪ {(i, j) ∈ E}j>i be the set of
edges connecting vertex i in G. For e, e′ ∈ E, we define e ∩ e′ = i ∈ V if e and e′ have
only one vertex i ∈ V in common. When e and e′ have four distinct vertices in V , we set
e ∩ e′ = 0. Finally, when e = e′, we set e ∩ e′ := ∞. For readability, we use the following
special notations: (a, b) 6=6 (c, d) means a 6= c and b 6= d, while as always, (a, b) 6= (c, d)
simply means a 6= c or b 6= d.
ITC 2020
4:6 Practical Relativistic Zero-Knowledge for NP
2.2 Non-local Games, and Relativistic Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs
Multi-provers interactive protocols are protocols involving a set of provers modelled by
interactive Turing machines, each of them interacting with an interactive PPT Turing
machine called the verifier V. Although all provers may share an infinite read-only auxiliary
input tape at the outset of their computation, they do not interact with each other. When
the provers are quantum, an extra auxiliary read-only quantum input tape is given and can
be entangled with other provers at the beginning.
I Definition 1. Let P1, . . . ,Pk be computationally unbounded interactive Turing machines
and let V be an interactive PPT Turing machine. The Pi’s share a joint, infinitely long,
read-only random tape (and an auxiliary reads-only quantum input tape if the provers are
quantum). Each Pi interacts with V but cannot interact with Pj for any 1 ≤ j 6= i ≤ k. We
call [P1, . . . ,Pk,V] a k-prover interactive protocol (k–prover IP).
A [P1, . . . ,Pk,V] k-prover interactive protocol is a multi-prover interactive proof system
for L if it can be used to show V that a public input x is such that x ∈ L. At the end of its
computation, V concludes x ∈ L if and only if it ends up in state accept. We restrict our
attention to interactive proof systems with perfect completeness since all our protocols have
this property.
I Definition 2. The k–prover interactive protocol Π = (P1, . . . ,Pk,V) is said to be a k-prover
interactive proof system with perfect completeness for L if there exists q(n) < 1 − 1poly(n)
such that following holds:
perfect completeness: (∀x ∈ L) [Pr{([P1, . . . ,Pk,V](x) = accept)} = 1],
soundness: (∀x /∈ L)(∀P˜1, . . . , P˜k)
[
Pr
{(
[P˜1, . . . , P˜k,V](x) = accept
)} ≤ q(|x|)].
The parameter q(|x|) is called the soundness error of Π. Soundness can hold against classical
provers or against quantum provers sharing entanglement. The former case is called sound
against classical provers while to latter is called sound against entangled provers.
Consider a k–prover interactive proof system Π(x) (with or without perfect completeness)
for L executed with public input x /∈ L. In this situation, Π(x) defines a so-called quantum
game. The minimum q(|x|) such that for all P′1, . . . ,P′k, Pr
{(
[P′1, . . . ,P′k,V](x) = accept
)} ≤
q(|x|) is called the classical value of game Π[x] and is denoted ω(Π(x)) when the provers are
restricted to be classical and unable to communicate with each other upon public input x.
When the provers, still unable to communicate with each other, are allowed to carry their com-
putation quantumly and share entanglement, we denote by ω∗(Π(x)) ≥ ω(Π(x)) the minimum
q(|x|) such that for all such quantum provers P′1, . . . ,P′k, Pr
{(
[P′1, . . . ,P′k,V](x) = accept
)} ≤
q(|x|). In this case, ω∗(Π(x)) is called the quantum value of game Π(x). A k–prover interact-
ive proof system for L is said to be symmetric if V can permute the questions to all provers
without changing their distribution.
The following result of Kempe, Kobayashi, Matsumoto, Toner, and Vidick[13] shows
that the classical value of a symmetric one-round classical game cannot be too far from the
quantum value of a modified game. Given a symmetric one-round two-prover game Π, one
can always add a third prover P3 and V asks P3 the same question than P1 with probability
1
2 or the same question than P2 with probability
1
2 . Then, V accepts if P1 and P2 would
be accepted in Π(x) and if P3 returns the same answer as the one issued by the prover it
emulates. We call Π′(x) the modified game obtained that way from Π(x).
I Lemma 3 ([13], Lemma 17). Let Π(x) be a two-prover one-round symmetric game and
let Π′(x) be its modified version with three provers. If ω∗(Π′(x)) > 1− ε then we always get
ω(Π(x)) > 1− ε− 12|Q|√ε where Q is the set of V’s possible questions to a prover in Π.
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Lemma 3 remains true for non-symmetric two-prover one-round protocol by first making
them symmetric at the cost of increasing the size of Q. This is always possible without
changing the classical value of the game and by using at most twice the number of questions
|Q| of the original game (Lemma 4 in [13]).
The Zero-knowledge [11] version of MIPs were also defined in [1]:
Let [P1, . . . ,Pk,V] be a k–prover IP. We denote by view(P1, . . . ,Pk,V, x) the random
variable of V’s outgoing and incoming messages with all provers according V’s coin tosses.
I Definition 4. Let [P1, . . . ,Pk,V] be a k-prover interactive proof system for L. We say that
[P1, . . . ,Pk,V] is perfect zero-knowledge if for all PPT interactive Turing machines V˜ there
exists a PPT machine Sim (i.e. the simulator) having blackbox access to V˜ such that for all
x ∈ L,
view(P1, . . . ,Pk, V˜, x) = Sim(x) ,
and both random variables are equivalent. In the following, we allow V˜ to be a quantum
machine but our simulators will always be classical machines with blackbox access to V˜. If the
zero-knowledge condition holds against quantum V˜, we say that the proof system is perfect
zero-knowledge against quantum verifiers.
2.3 Multi-Prover Commitments with Implicit Unveiling
Our multi-prover proof systems for 3COL use a simple 2-committer commitment scheme
with a property allowing to guarantee perfect zero-knowledge. In this section, we give the
description of this simple commitment scheme with its important properties for our purposes.
Assume that provers P1 and P2 share ` values c1, c2, . . . , c` ∈ F where F is a finite field. V
wants to check that these values satisfy some properties without revealing the specific values.
Bit commitment schemes have been used in the multi-prover model ever since it was
introduced in [1]. The original scheme was basically wi := bi · ri + ci, a commitment wi
to value ci ∈ F using pre-agreed random mask bi ∈R F and randomness ri ∈ F∗ provided
by V. Kilian[17] had a binary version where each bit ci := c1i ⊕ c2i ⊕ c3i is shared among
provers P1 and P2 (and therefore F needs only to be a group). To commit ci, V samples
chi from P1 and c
j
i from P2 at random. If j = h but c
j
i 6= chi , V immediately rejects the
commitment. Otherwise either P1 or P2 may unveil by disclosing c1i , c2i , c3i at a later time.
Somehow, Crépeau’s bad recollection of the scheme in [1] lead [2] to a similar but different
scheme defining wi := ci · ri + bi, a commitment wi to bit ci ∈ {0, 1} using pre-agreed
bit mask bi ∈R {0, 1} and binary randomness ri provided by their corresponding verifiers.
Although this latter form of commitment is intimately connected to the CHSH game [6]
and the Popescu-Rohrlich box[20], this proximity is not relevant for the soundness and the
completeness of our protocols, even against entangled provers. While the binding property
of the latter scheme has been established in [15, 8, 23, 9, 19, 3] against entangled provers, it
is still not clear how to get sound and complete proof systems against such provers. We shall
rather get completeness and soundness against entangled provers using a different technique
from [13] that uses a third prover.
For an arbitrary field F, the commitment scheme produces commitment wi := ci · ri + bi
to field element ci ∈ F using pre-agreed field element mask bi (specific to value 1 ≤ i ≤ `)
and random field element ri ∈ F∗ provided by their corresponding verifiers. Many results
were proven for this specific form of the commitments. Notice however that the two versions
discussed above, wi := bi · ri + ci in the former case and wi := ci · ri + bi in the latter have
equivalent binding property(left as a simple exercice). Considering, the former as being
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the degree-one secret sharing [22] of ci hidden in the degree zero term, while the latter
being the degree-one secret sharing of ci hidden in the degree one term, we decided to use
the former (original BGKW form) because all the known results about secret sharing are
generally presented in this form. In particular, this form is more adapted to higher degree
generalizations such as wi := ai · r2i + bi · ri + ci being the degree-two secret sharing of ci
hidden in the degree zero term, and so on.
Moreover, this choice turns out to simplify our (perfect) zero-knowledge simulator. For the
rest of this paper, we use wi := bi · ri + ci where wi, bi, ci ∈ F3 and ri ∈ F∗3. Provers therefore
commit to trits, one value for each vertex corresponding to its colour in a 3–colouring of
graph G = (V,E). The values shared between P1 and P2 are therefore, for each vertex i ∈ V ,
the colour ci of that vertex and a vertex specific random mask bi.
Suppose that V asks P1 to commit on the colour ci of vertex i ∈ V using randomness
r ∈R F∗3. Let w = bi · r + ci be the commitment returned to V by P1. Suppose V asks P2 to
commit on the colour cj of vertex j ∈ V using randomness r′ ∈R F∗3. Let w′ = bj · r′ + cj
be the commitment issued to V by P2. The following 3 cases are possible depending on V’s
choices for i, j, r, and r′:
1. (forever hiding) if i 6= j then V learns nothing on neither ci nor cj since w and w′ hide ci
and cj with random and independent masks bi · r and bj · r′ respectively. Even knowing
r, r′ ∈ F∗3, bi · r and bj · r′ are uniformly distributed in F3.
2. (consistency testing) If i = j and r = r′ then V can verify that w = w′. This corresponds
to the immediate rejection of V in Kilian’s two-prover commitment described above. It
allows V to make sure that P1 and P2 are consistent when asked to commit on the same
value.
3. (implicit unveiling) If i = j and r′ 6= r then V can learn ci (assuming w = bi · r + ci and
w′ = bi · r′ + ci) the following way. V simply computes ci := −(w + w′) (Note that over
an arbitrary field ci := (wr′− w′r)(r′− r)−1 whenever r 6= r′). Interpreting the meaning
of this test can be done when considering a strategy for P1 and P2 that always passes the
consistency test. In this case, w − bi · r = ci = w′ − bi · r′ are satisfied and V learns ci.
As long as P1 and P2 are local (or quantum non-local) they cannot distinguish which option
V has picked among the three. The consistency test makes sure that if P1 and P2 do not
commit on identical values for some i ∈ V then V will detect it when V picks the consistency
test for commitment w and w′ in position i.
3 Classical Two-Prover Protocol
First, consider a small variation over the protocol of Cleve et al. presented in [7]. In their
protocol, when P1 and P2 both know and act upon the same valid 3-colouring of G, V asks
each prover for the colour of a vertex in G = (V,E). Consistency is verified when V asks
the same vertex to each prover and compares that the same colour has been provided. The
colorability is checked when the provers are asked for the colour of two connected vertices in
G. This way of proceeding is however problematic for the zero-knowledge condition. V could
be asking two vertices that do not form an edge for which their respective colour will be
unveiled. This certainly allows V to learn something about P1’s and P2’s colouring. Indeed,
repeating this many times will allow V to efficiently reconstruct a complete colouring. To
remedy partially this problem, V is instead asking each prover the colouring of an entire edge
of G. The colouring is (only) checked when both provers are asked the same edge, while
consistency is checked when two intersecting edges are asked to the provers.
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3.1 Distribution of questions
Let G = (V,E) be a connected undirected graph. Let us define the probability distribution
DG = {(p(e, e′), (e, e′))}e,e′∈E for the pair (e, e′) ∈ E × E that V picks with probability
p(e, e′) before announcing e to P1 and e′ to P2. For e, e′ ∈ E such that e ∩ e′ = 0, we set
p(e, e′) := 0 so that V never asks two disconnected edges in G (this would be useless).
The first thing to do is to pick e = (i, j) ∈ E uniformly at random. With probability  (to
be selected later), we set e′ = e, which allows for an edge-verification test. With probability
1− , we perform a well-definition test as follows. With probability 12 , e′ ∈ Edges(i) uniformly
at random and with probability 12 , e′ ∈ Edges(j) uniformly at random. In other words, the
well-definition test picks the second edge e′ with probability 12 among the edges connecting
i ∈ V and with probability 12 among the edges connecting j ∈ V . It follows that for
e = (i, j) ∈ E and e′ ∈ (Edges(i) ∪ Edges(j)) \{e}, we have
p(e, e′) = 1− 2|E|
( |{e′} ∩ Edges(i)|
|Edges(i)| +
|{e′} ∩ Edges(j)|
|Edges(j)|
)
. (1)
We also get
p(e, e) = |E| +
1− 
2|E|
(
1
|Edges(i)| +
1
|Edges(j)|
)
≥ |E| . (2)
It is easy to verify that DG is a properly defined probability distribution over pairs of
edges.
3.2 A Variant Over the Two-Prover Protocol of Cleve et al.
Distribution DG produces two edges where the first one is provided to P1 while the second
one is provided to P2. Each prover then returns the colour of each vertex of the edge to V.
We denote the resulting protocol Π(2)std.
Protocol Π(2)std[G] : Two-prover, 3-COL.
Provers P1,P2 pre-agree on a random 3-colouring of G:
{(i, ci)|ci ∈ F3}i∈V such that (i, j)∈E =⇒ cj 6= ci.
Interrogation phase:
V picks ((i, j), (i′, j′)) ∈DG E × E, sends (i, j) to P1 and (i′, j′) to P2.
If (i, j)∈E then P1 replies with ci, cj .
If (i′, j′)∈E then P2 replies with ci′ , cj′ .
Check phase:
Edge-Verification Test:
if (i, j) = (i′, j′) then V accepts iff ci = ci′ 6= cj′ = cj .
Well-Definition Test:
if (i, j) ∩ (i′, j′) = h ∈ V then V accepts iff ch = c′h.
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The perfect soundness of this protocol is not difficult to establish along the same lines of
the proof of soundness for the original protocol in [7]. On the other hand, zero-knowledge
does not even hold against honest verifiers. V learns the colour of each vertex contained in
any two edges of G. This is certainly information about the colouring that V learns after
the interaction. To some extend, the modifications we applied to the 2-prover interactive
proof system of [7] leaks even more to V. In the next section, we show that the 2-prover
commitment scheme, that we introduced in Sect. 2.3, can be used in protocol Π(2)std to prevent
this leakage completely.
4 Perfect Zero-Knowledge Two-Prover Protocol
We modify the protocol of section 3.2 to prevent V from learning the colours of more than
two connected vertices in G. The idea is simple, P1 and P2 will return commitments for
the colours of the vertices asked by V. The implicit unveiling of the commitment scheme
described in section 2.3 will allow V to perform both the edge-verification and well-definition
tests in a very similar way that in protocol Π(2)std. The commitments require V to provide a
random nonzero trit for each vertex of the edge requested to a prover.
4.1 Distribution of questions
We now define the probability distribution D′G for V’s questions in protocol Π(2)lhv[G] defined
in the following section. It consists in one edge and two nonzero trits for each prover:
D′G = {(p′(e, r, s, e′, r′, s′), ((e, r, s), (e′, r′, s′))}e,e′∈E,r,s,r′,s′∈F∗3
upon graph G = (V,E) and where (e, r, s) is the question to P1 and (e′, r′, s′) is the question
to P2. D′G is easily derived from the distribution DG for the questions in Π(2)std[G], as defined
in section 3.1. First, an edge e ∈R E is picked uniformly at random. Together with e, two
nonzero trits r, s ∈R F∗3 are picked at random. Then, as in DG, with probability  (to be
selected later) the second edge e′ = e, in which case we always set r′ = −r and s′ = −s.
This case allows for an edge-verification test. Finally, with probability 1 − , we pick e′
with probability p(e, e′)|E| so that the couple ((e, r, s), (e′, r, t)) is produced with probability
1
8p(e, e′) for all e, e′ ∈ E, and r, s, t ∈ F∗3. This will allow for a well-definition test. A
consequence of (1) is that for e = (i, j) ∈ E, e′ ∈ Edges(i) ∪ Edges(j)
p′(e, r, s, e′, r, t) ≥ 1− 16|E|
( |{e′} ∩ Edges(i)|
|Edges(i)| +
|{e′} ∩ Edges(j)|
|Edges(j)|
)
, (3)
where the inequality results from e = e′ being possible. According to (2), we also get
p′(e, r, s, e,−r,−s) = p(e, e)4 ≥

4|E| . (4)
4.2 The Protocol
The protocol is similar to Π(2)std except that instead of returning to V the colour for each
vertex of an edge in G, each prover returns commitments with implicit unveiling of these
colours. If V asks two disjoint edges then V learns nothing about the values committed by
the forever-hiding property of the commitment scheme. The resulting 2–prover one-round
interactive proof system is denoted Π(2)lhv.
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Protocol Π(2)lhv[G] : Two-prover, 3-COL
P1 and P2 pre-agree on random masks bi ∈R F3 for each i ∈ V and a random
3-colouring of G: {(i, ci)|ci ∈ F3}i∈V such that (i, j)∈E =⇒ cj 6= ci.
Commit phase:
V picks (((i, j), r, s), ((i′, j′), r′, s′)) ∈D′
G
(
E × (F∗3)2
)2.
V sends ((i, j), r, s) to P1 and ((i′, j′), r′, s′) to P2.
If (i, j) ∈ E then P1 replies wi = bi · r + ci and wj = bj · s+ cj .
If (i′, j′) ∈ E then P2 replies w′i′ = bi′ · r′ + ci′ and w′j′ = bj′ · s′ + cj′ .
Check phase:
Edge-Verification Test:
if (i, j) = (i′, j′) and (r′, s′) 6=6 (r, s) then V accept iff wi + w′i 6= wj + w′j .
Well-Definition Test:
If (i, j) = (i′, j′) and (r′, s′) = (r, s) then V accepts iff (wi = w′i) ∧ (wj = w′j).
if (i, j) ∩ (i′, j′) = i and r′ = r then V accepts iff wi = w′i.
If (i, j) ∩ (i′, j′) = j and s′ = s then V accepts iff wj = w′j .
Clearly, Π(2)lhv satisfies perfect completeness. The following theorem establishes that in
addition to perfect completeness, Π(2)lhv is sound against classical provers.
I Theorem 5. The two-prover interactive proof system Π(2)lhv is perfectly complete with
classical value ω(Π(2)lhv[G]) ≤ 1− 19|E| upon any graph G = (V,E) /∈ 3COL.
Proof. Assume G /∈ 3COL and let us consider the probability δ that V detects an error in the
check phase when interacting with two local dishonest provers P˜1 and P˜2. Π(2)lhv is a one-round
protocol where the provers cannot communicate directly with each other nor through V’s
questions since they are independent of the provers’ answers. It follows that the strategy
of P˜1 and P˜2 can be made deterministic without damaging the soundness error by letting
each prover choosing the answer that maximizes her/his probability of success given her/his
question. Therefore, consider a deterministic strategy as a pair of arrays W `[i, r, j, s] ∈ F23
to be used by prover P˜` for `∈{1, 2} (note: we only care about the entries where (i, j)∈E
upon question ((i, j), r, s) with i < j. V can always present edges in the same order)). For
z ∈ {1, 2}, W `z [·, ·, ·, ·] is the z-th component of the output pair W `[·, ·, ·, ·]. We say that
W [i, r] for [i, r] ∈ E ×F∗3 is well defined if for all j, k such that (i, j), (i, k)∈E and ∀s, t ∈ F∗3,
one of the following 4 equalities is true depending on which of j > i or j < i, k > i or k < i
is correct
W 11 [i, r, j, s] = W 21 [i, r, k, t] = W 12 [j, s, i, r], or W 11 [i, r, j, s] = W 22 [k, t, i, r] = W 22 [k, t, i, r] (5)
When W [i, r] is well defined for all i ∈ V, r ∈ F∗3, we say that W is well defined.
We now lower bound the probability δwdt > 0 that, when W [i, r] is not well-defined for
some i ∈ V and r ∈ F∗3, the well-definition test will detect it. When (5) is not satisfied ,
w.l.o.g. we have W 11 [i, r, j, s] 6= W 21 [i, r, k, t] for some (i, j), (i, k) ∈ E. The other three cases
are treated similarly. Let e = (i, j) and e′ = (i, k) be these two edges. According to (3) (and
(1) when e = e′), the well-definition test will then detect an error with probability
Pr{(V picks e and e′ with randmoness r, s, t)} = p′(e, r, s, e′, r, t) ≥ 1− 16|E||Edges(i)| . (6)
However, we can do much better: we observe that if W [i, r] is not well defined, we can detect
it in at least 2|Edges(i)| places. Consider any ` > i such that (i, `) ∈ E and u ∈ F∗3 (The case
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where ` < i is treated similarly). It is obvious that one of the following three statements
must be true:
W 11 [i, r, j, s] 6= W 21 [i, r, `, u], W 11 [i, r, `, u] 6= W 21 [i, r, `, u], or W 11 [i, r, `, u] 6= W 21 [i, r, k, t].
It follows that if W [i, r] is not well defined then there are 2|Edges(i)| ways for V to catch
the provers and each of these has probability at least 1−16|E|·|Edges(i)| to be picked. It follows
that,
δwdt ≥ (1− ) · 2|Edges(i)|16|E| · |Edges(i)| =
1− 
8|E| .
Now, assume that W is well-defined, which means that the commitment values produced
by the provers satisfy the consistency test. As discussed in section 2.3, when the commitments
are consistent, the unique colours committed upon are defined by ci := − (W [i, r] +W [i,−r])
for both values of r. Since G /∈ 3COL, two of the vertices must be of the same colour at the
end-points of at least one edge (i∗, j∗) ∈ E. In this case the edge-verification test will detect
it when (i∗, j∗) is the edge announced to both provers and if randomness (r, s) ∈ F∗3 × F∗3 is
announced to P1 then (−r,−s) is the randomness announced to P˜2. Using (4), the probability
δevt to detect such an edge when W is well defined satisfies
δevt ≥
∑
r,s
min
e∈E
(p′(e, r, s, e,−r,−s)) ≥ |E| .
Therefore, the detection probability δ of any deterministic strategy for G /∈ 3COL satisfies
δ ≥ min(δwdt, δevt) ≥ 19|E| (maximized at  = 1/9) .
The result follows as the classical value of the game ω
(
Π(2)lhv[G]
)
≤ 1− δ. J
To prove (perfect) zero-knowledge, it suffices to show that if ((i, j), r, s) and ((i′, j′), r′, s′)
are selected arbitrarily, V can determine at most the colours of two vertices (that form an
edge). The commitments prevent a dishonest prover V˜ to learn the colours of two vertices
that are not connected by an edge in G. Proving this is not very hard and will be done
in Section 5.3 for the three-prover case (although with three provers, V˜ may also learn the
colour of three vertices that form a triangle). The addition of a third prover will allow, using
lemma 3, to get soundness against entangled provers without compromising zero-knowledge.
As shown in [7], their protocol is not necessarily sound against two entangled provers. We
also do not know whether Π(2)std is sound against two entangled provers.
5 Three-Prover Protocol Sound Against Entangled Provers
The three-prover protocol Π(3)qnl, defined below, is identical to Π
(2)
lhv except that P3 is asked
to repeat exactly what P1 or P2 has replied. The prover that P3 is asked to emulate is
picked at random by V. An application of lemma 3 allows to conclude the soundness of Π(3)qnl
against entangled provers. Zero-knowledge remains since the only way to provide V with
the colours of more than two connected vertices is if they form a complete triangle of G.
This reveals nothing beyond the fact that G ∈ 3COL to V, since all vertices will then show
different colours.
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5.1 Distribution of questions
The probability distribution D̂G for V’s questions to the three provers is easily obtained from
the distribution D′G for the questions in protocol Π(2)lhv[G]. V picks ((e, r, s), (e′, r′, s′)) ∈D′G(
E × (F∗3)2
)2 and sets eˆ = e, rˆ = r, and sˆ = s with probability 12 or sets eˆ = e′, rˆ = r′,
and sˆ = s′ also with probability 12 . Defined that way, D̂G is a properly defined probability
distribution for V’s three questions, each one in E × (F∗3)2.
5.2 The Protocol
In protocol Π(3)qnl, after the three questions picked according D̂G by V have been answered by
the the provers, V accepts if and only if the replies of P1 and P2 are accepted in Π(2)lhv and in
addition, P3 gave the same reply than the prover it emulates.
Protocol Π(3)qnl[G] : Three-prover, 3-COL.
Provers P1,P2, and P3 pre-agree on random values bi ∈R F3 for all i ∈ V and a
random 3-colouring of G: {(i, ci)|ci ∈ {0, 1, 2}}i∈V such that (i, j)∈E =⇒ cj 6= ci.
Commit phase:
V picks (((i, j), r, s), ((i′, j′), r′, s′), ((ˆı, ˆ), rˆ, sˆ)) ∈D̂G
(
E × (F∗3)2
)3.
V sends ((i, j), r, s) to P1, ((i′, j′), r′, s′) to P2, and ((ˆı, ˆ), rˆ, sˆ) to P3.
If (i, j) ∈ E then P1 replies wi = bi · r + ci and wj = bj · s+ cj .
If (i′, j′) ∈ E then P2 replies w′i′ = bi′ · r′ + ci′ and w′j′ = bj′ · s′ + cj′ .
If (ˆı, ˆ) ∈ E then P3 replies wˆıˆ = bıˆ · rˆ + cıˆ and wˆˆ = bˆ · sˆ+ cˆ.
Check phase:
Consistency Test:
If ((ˆı, ˆ), rˆ, sˆ) = ((i, j), r, s) then V rejects if (wi, wj) 6= (wˆıˆ, wˆˆ).
If ((ˆı, ˆ), rˆ, sˆ) = ((i′, j′), r′, s′) then V rejects if (w′i′ , w′j′) 6= (wˆıˆ, wˆˆ).
Edge-Verification Test:
if (i, j) = (i′, j′) and (r′, s′) 6=6 (r, s) then V accept iff wi + w′i 6= wj + w′j .
Well-Definition Test:
If (i, j) = (i′, j′) and (r′, s′) = (r, s) then V accepts iff (wi = w′i) ∧ (wj = w′j).
if (i, j) ∩ (i′, j′) = i and r = r′ then V accepts iff wi = w′i.
If (i, j) ∩ (i′, j′) = j and s = s′ then V accepts iff wj = w′j .
The soundness of protocol Π(3)qnl against entangled provers can easily be shown a direct
consequence of the soundness of protocol Π(2)lhv against classical provers, by an application
of Lemma 3. Indeed, the soundness error corresponds to the quantum value of the game
when G = (V,E) /∈ 3COL provided Π(2)lhv is symmetric. As defined in Sect. 4.1 however, the
distribution of questions D′G is not necessarily symmetric since the first edge e is picked
uniformly at random in E while the second edge e′ ∈ E is picked from e in a way that the
marginal may not be uniform. However, Π(2)lhv can easily be turned into a symmetric protocol
by picking (e, r, s), (e′, r′, s′) according D′G and announcing (e, r, s) to P1 and (e′, r′, s′) to P2
with probability 12 while announcing (e, r, s) to P2 and (e′, r′, s′) to P1 with probability
1
2 .
The resulting symmetric protocol is equivalent to Π(2)lhv and therefore shares its classical value
upper bounded in Theorem 5 and the set of questions Q to each player remains the same as
for Π(2)lhv. In the symmetric version, Q is thus the same for every prover and |Q| = 4|E|.
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I Theorem 6. The three-prover interactive proof system Π(3)qnl is perfectly complete and has
quantum value
ω∗
(
Π(3)qnl[G]
)
≤ 1−
(
1
9|E|+ 432|E|2
)2
≤ 1−
(
1
21|E|
)4
(7)
upon any graph G = (V,E) /∈ 3COL.
Proof. Assume G = (V,E) /∈ 3COL. The contrapositive of Lemma 3 indicates any one-round
symmetric game Π(2)lhv[G] with classical value ω
(
Π(2)lhv[G]
)
≤ 1− δ − 12|Q|√δ is such that the
modified game Π(3)qnl[G] has quantum value ω∗
(
Π(3)qnl[G]
)
≤ 1− δ. The set Q of questions to
each player satisfies |Q| = 4|E|. Theorem 5 establishes that δ+12|Q|√δ ≥ 19|E| , which implies√
δ ≥ 1(√δ+12|Q|)·9|E| ≥
1
(1+12|Q|)·9|E| =
1
9|E|+432|E|2 ≥ 1441|E|2 , and the result follows. J
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 6, Ω(|E|4) sequential repetitions of Π(3)qnl
produces an interactive proof system for 3COL with negligible soundness error. Although
the resulting proof system can be implemented on short distances, these many sequential
rounds need to be performed at high rate for a given proof to be concluded in reasonable
time. A few executions of Π(3)qnl could be ran in parallel without having to greatly increase
the distances while reducing the number of sequential rounds. However, we don’t know how
the soundness error decreases when Π(3)qnl is ran only a few times in parallel, even though the
results of Kempe and Vidick, a quantum version of Raz’s parallel repetition theorem[21],
indicate that Ω(|E|4) runs in parallel produces a proof system with negligible soundness
error[14].
5.3 Proof of Perfect Zero-Knowledge
In this section, we prove that protocol Π(3)qnl is perfect zero-knowledge. As a consequence,
Π(2)lhv is also zero-knowledge since everything V˜ sees in Π
(2)
lhv can also be observed in Π
(3)
qnl. The
proof of zero-knowledge proceeds using the fact that a vertex must appear at least twice
to have its colour unveiled. This is the forever hiding property of the commitment scheme
described in Section 2.3. Notice that this would be enough for V˜ to learn something about
the colouring if no extra condition on these three vertices is observed. In fact, we can easily
show that only a few cases of colour disclosure are possible and in each of these cases, V˜
learns nothing about the colouring that it could not have computed on its own. V˜ can only
learn the colour of two connected vertices in G and nothing else or the colours of three
vertices forming a triangle in G. In each of these cases, V˜ learns random distinct colours for
these vertices, which is to be expected by a valid 3-colouring of G. Let us show why this
is enforced by the properties (see Section 2.3) of the commitment scheme. Remember that
in order to learn the colour assigned to a vertex i ∈ V , V˜ must ask that vertex to at least
2 distinct provers. Otherwise, V˜ sees only random values returned by the provers. There
are 8 cases of figure depending on how V˜ selects the 3 edges asked. Figure 3 shows all cases.
The 3 edges indicated for each case are the one picked by V˜. The colours associated to white
vertices remain hidden by the forever hiding property of the commitment scheme. For these
vertices, the committed values received from the provers are just random and independent
elements in F3. In each of the 8 cases, the unveiled colours of the vertices are displayed in
shape and colour. We see that the only way to unveil the colour of two vertices (cases 4, 5, 6,
and 7) is when they are connected by an edge, which means that the colours of both vertices
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are random but distinct. The only way for V˜ to learn the colour of 3 distinct vertices is
when they form a triangle (case 8). In this case, V˜ learns three random and distinct colours.
Clearly, this is nothing more than something necessarily true when G ∈ 3COL.
These properties of the commitment scheme allow, for any quantum polynomial-time
dishonest verifier V˜, an easy simulator for view(P1,P2,P3, V˜, G) when G ∈ 3COL, thus
establishing that Π(3)qnl is perfect zero-knowledge.
I Theorem 7. The three-prover interactive proof system Π(3)qnl is perfect zero-knowledge
against quantum verifiers.
Proof. The simulator Sim is classical given blackbox access to V˜ (and V˜ can be quantum).
Consider an execution Sim(G) upon graph G = (V,E). It first picks a random permutation
col[·] : F3 7→ F3 over three colours, each corresponding to a distinct element in F3. Table
mark[i, r] ∈ {true, false}, for i ∈ V and r ∈ F∗3, is initialized to false and will indicate if
the output of a prover has already been simulated for vertex i with randomness r. Table
count[i], for i ∈ V , counts the number of times vertex i has been asked so far during the
simulation. Variable c ∈ F3, initialized to 0, indicates the next colour index the simulator
should use when a new colour must be unveiled during the simulation.
Simulator Sim(G) : Simulator for V˜’s view upon graph G in Π(3)qnl.
All arithmetic below is performed in F3.
1. Let col[·] be a uniform permutation of F3 and let c := 0.
2. ∀i∈V,∀r∈F∗3, let mark[i, r] := false and count[i] := 0.
3. Run V˜ until it returns ((i1, j1), r1, s1), ((i2, j2), r2, s2), ((i3, j3), r3, s3).
4. For each ` ∈ {1, 2, 3} do:
Whenever (i`, j`)∈E is provided by V˜, output (w`i` , w`j`) ∈ F3 × F3 to V˜, both
computed as follows:
a. If ¬mark[i`, r`] then
If count[i`] = 0 then pick W [i`, r`] ∈R F3.
If count[i`] = 1 then set W [i`, r`] := −col[c]−W [i`,−r`], c := c+ 1.
count[i`] := count[i`] + 1.
b. If ¬mark[j`, s`] then
If count[j`] = 0 then pick W [j`, s`] ∈R F3.
If count[j`] = 1 then set W [j`, s`] := −col[c]−W [j`,−s`], c := c+ 1.
count[j`] := count[j`] + 1.
c. mark[i`, r`] := true, mark[j`, s`] := true.
d. w`i` := W [i`, r`], w
`
j`
:= W [j`, s`].
V˜ is then invoked to produce questions ((i`, j`), r`, s`) for all provers P`, ` ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Sim
now aims at setting the values (w`i` , w
`
j`
) for P`’s commitments. If (i`, j`) /∈ E, Sim produces
no value for (w`i` , w
`
j`
), exactly as P` in Π(3)qnl.
When (i`, j`) ∈ E, Sim first produces P`’s commitment w`i` for i` ∈ V and then produces
P`’s commitment w`j` for j` ∈ V . We show how w`i` , w`j` is computed similarly mutatis
mutandis:
if mark[i`, r`] then Sim returns the value of w`i` already determined for the simulation of
the commitment of an earlier prover Ph, h < `. This ensures that both the commitment’s
consistency test performed and the well-definition test are always successful, as in Π(3)qnl
with honest provers.
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Figure 3 The 8 ways to unveil the colours of at most 3 vertices in Π(3)qnl.
if ¬mark[i`, r`] then Sim has never simulated a commitment of the colour for vertex i`
with randomness r`. The value count[i`] indicates the number of times prior to this
value for `, vertex i` has been asked:
If count[i`] = 0 then w`i` ∈R F3 is picked uniformly at random, as it should be when
the commitment value for the colour of vertex i` is observed in isolation.
If count[i`] = 1 then the colour associated to vertex i` has been committed to
value whi` by an earlier simulated prover Ph, h < ` upon randomness −r` (otherwise,
mark[i`, r`] = true). Sim sets w`i` = −col[c]−whi` , which satisfies the implicit unveiling
of random colour col[c] = −w`i` − whi` . The current colour c is incremented.
The value of count[i`] is increased by one and mark[i`, r`] = true, as the colour of vertex
i` with randomness r` has been committed upon by the simulated prover P`.
Let (w1i1 , w
1
j1
), (w2i2 , w
2
j2
), and (w3i3 , w
3
j3
) be all commitment values simulated by Sim. As
discussed above and shown in Fig. 3, the colours of no more than 3 vertices are unveiled in
the process. Sim always unveils as many different colours as there are colours unveiled to V˜.
If Sim’s simulated committed values unveils only the colour of one vertex then that colour is
random, as it should in this case in Π(3)qnl.
If Sim’s committed values unveils the colours of exactly 2 vertices then these 2 vertices
form an edge in G and the colours are two different random colours, as it should be in Π(3)qnl.
Finally, when Sim’s committed values unveil the colours of exactly 3 vertices then these
vertices form a triangle in G. The 3 colours unveiled by Sim to V˜ are different and assigned
randomly to each of the 3 vertices, as it is in Π(3)qnl. Otherwise, if w`i for i ∈ V has been
generated with only one random value then w`i is random and uniform in F3, exactly as it is
in Π(3)qnl in the same situation. It is now clear that,
view(P1,P2,P3, V˜, G) = Sim(G) ,
and Π(3)qnl is perfect zero-knowledge. J
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Note: Since no rewinding is used by our simulator, it is absolutely unnecessary to explicitly
handle auxiliary-inputs or the fact that V is quantum. No special care is required to handle
these considerations that become highly non-trivial in the case where rewinding is required.
6 Conclusion and Open Problems
We have provided a three-prover perfect zero-knowledge proof system for NP sound against
entangled provers that is implementable in some well controlled environment. In order to
make it fully practical, it would be better to find a protocol with smaller soundness error
and requiring only two provers.
Our protocols are proofs of membership whereas in practice we would like to use them for
identification purpose in which scenario proofs of knowledge is what we really need.
Moreover, we would like to extend our techniques to prove any language in QMA or
QCMA, the natural quantum extensions of NP.
We would also want to prove whether Π(2)std is sound against entangled provers. Finally,
we seek a variant of Π(2)std that would be sound against No-Signalling provers and variants of
Π(2)lhv and Π
(3)
qnl that are both sound against No-Signalling provers and Zero-Knowledge.
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